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Abstract
This study explores the forces that drive the formation of physician patient
sharing networks. In particular, I examine the degree to which hospital affilia-
tion drives physicians' sharing of Medicare patients. Using a revealed prefer-
ence framework where observed network links are taken to be pairwise
stable, I estimate the physicians' pair‐specific values using a tetrad maximum
score estimator that is robust to the presence of unobserved physician specific
characteristics. I also control for a number of potentially confounding patient
sharing channels, such as (a) common physician group or hospital system affil-
iation, (b) physician homophily, (c) knowledge complementarity, (d) patient
side considerations related to both geographic proximity and insurance net-
work participation, and (e) spillover from other collaborations. Focusing on
the Chicago hospital referral region, I find that shared hospital affiliation
accounts for 36.5% of the average pair‐specific utility from a link. Implications
for reducing care fragmentation are discussed.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Recent work has helped uncover important relationships between the underlying structure of physician patient sharing
networks and overall health care outcomes (Barnett, Song, & Landon, 2012a; Landon et al., 2018). One aspect of network
structure that is related to health care outcomes is care fragmentation. Fragmented service delivery occurs when a patient
is seen by a large number of physicians, introducing risk for lapses in coordination of care, with growing evidence that
network structures with large numbers of specialist providers (i.e., higher levels of fragmented care) are associated with
higher health care utilization and higher costs (Agha, Marzilli Ericson, Geissler, & Rebitzer, 2018; Agha, Frandsen, &
Rebitzer, 2019). However, despite the advances in connecting physician patient sharing networks with outcome mea-
sures, less is known about the factors that give rise to these physician networks in the first place. By combining knowledge
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of why physicians seek certain ties with what we know about the impact of these structures on outcomes, the hope is that
stakeholders seeking to improve the current medical system will be able to develop strategies that provide appropriate
physician incentives for achieving the desired patient sharing network structure.
One hurdle in accomplishing this aim has been that establishing a credible case for causality in the presence of unob-
servable physician specific characteristics that may play a role in physician patient sharing (e.g., unobserved reputation
or quality measures) is particularly problematic in social network settings where the researcher commonly works with
cross sectional data on a sparse network that exhibits considerable degree heterogeneity (see, e.g., Chandrasekhar, 2016;
Graham, 2017).1 Because the sparsity of the network makes standard fixed effects approaches problematic within these
settings, alternative methodologies have been developed for dealing with the identification issue introduced by unob-
served degree heterogeneity (see, e.g., Graham, 2017; Kim, 2018).2 In the present study, I utilize a revealed preference
framework that assumes that the observed physician patient sharing network is the outcome of a strategic network for-
mation game (a la Jackson & Wolinsky, 1996), where the resulting network ties are assumed to be pairwise stable in that
physicians do not want to deviate to either remove any existing ties or add any nonexisting ties. The equilibrium notion
of pairwise stability provides me with inequalities that are used to estimate the parameters of physicians' link specific
utility (using a tetrad maximum score estimator), which allows me to account for physicians' degree heterogeneity that
may stem from physician‐specific unobservables.
Specifically, this study explores the degree to which physician patient sharing is driven by having a common hospital
affiliation. Understanding the effect that a shared hospital affiliation has on physicians patient sharing behavior is of
particular policy relevance as delineating accountable care organizations (ACOs) along the boundaries of hospital affil-
iated physicians has previously been proposed within the literature as a strategy for combating care fragmentation, and
in turn, high costs and poor quality outcomes (Fisher, Staiger, Bynum, & Gottlieb, 2007). In order to attempt to capture
a causal effect, I include a number of potentially confounding link formation channels in addition to controlling for
physician‐specific unobservables. The included control variables draw from trends noted by Landon et al. (2012) and
Barnett, Landon, O'Malley, Keating, and Christakis (2011) related to why physicians form collaboration relationships
and share patients, including (a) institutional affiliations beyond a shared hospital affiliation; (b) physician homophily
due to shared characteristics (e.g., gender and/or years of experience); (c) knowledge complementarity in terms of phy-
sician specialties; (d) patient considerations related to the geographic proximity and economic accessibility (based on
insurance network inclusion) of other physicians; and (e) collaboration spillover, where physicians share patient groups
due to existing collaboration ties and/or familiarity. Naturally, other physician idiosyncratic factors such as a physician's
reputation for quality and service, his/her patient panel characteristics, and even personality, may factor into the num-
ber of patient sharing ties that one physician has when compared with another. As such, accounting for potential unob-
served physician link heterogeneity is critical to evaluating the overall importance and relative significance of hospital
affiliation on physicians' patient sharing.
The present study builds on, and contributes to, a number of different but related literatures. First, it contributes to
the recent literature on empirical network formation estimation, where previous contributions have looked at airline
networks (McCalman & Rysman, 2019) and social lending networks in India (Kim, 2018). The second is the literature
on physician referrals, which has primarily focused on surveying physicians regarding their referral behavior (Barnett
et al., 2011; Forrest, Nutting, Von Schrader, Rohde, & Starfield, 2006; Gonzalez & Rizzo, 1991; Kinchen, Cooper, Levine,
Wang, & Powe, 2004). Although these studies provide important insights for factors that may contribute towards phy-
sicians' patient sharing, the present study differs by considering physician patient sharing (rather than direct referrals).
Additionally, preferences for whom to collaborate with are elicited directly from shared patient data via a revealed pref-
erence approach rather than using survey data. The third related line of work has focused on using physician patient
sharing data to approximate physician social/collaboration ties. Here, Barnett et al. (2011) and Landon et al. (2012) pro-
vided the important validation for this methodology, whereas other studies have followed, establishing relationships
between observed network structures and health care outcomes in terms of utilization, cost, and quality (see, e.g.,
An, O'Malley, Rockmore, & Stock, 2018; Barnett et al., 2012b; Pollack, Weissman, Bekelman, Liao, & Armstrong,
2012, 2014) and to describe important properties of the physician patient sharing networks (Landon et al., 2018). The
1A sparse network refers to a network where only a subset of all possible network links are present, whereas degree heterogeneity refers to the obser-
vation that some people within the network have several links, while others only have a few links. Degree heterogeneity is a function of both observable
and unobservable heterogeneities in attributes across physicians.
2Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015) and Pakes (2010) provide a general framework for dealing with these types of identification issues more broadly in
the context of estimation with moment inequalities.
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present study builds on, and contributes towards, this strand of work by focusing in on the physician incentives that give
rise to the observed network structures studied within this literature, while paying close attention to the empirical issue
of unobserved physician degree heterogeneity.
The dataset consists of 1,306 physicians (MD or DO) who practiced within the Chicago hospital referral region in
2016 and who collectively had 12,091 patient sharing ties. The physician level data are unusually rich in that it spans
information on physician: Medicare patient sharing, characteristics, affiliations (group, hospital and system), geographic
practice location, and insurance plan participation across most individual (under 65), small‐, mid‐, and large‐group
market plans sold both on and off the federal and state exchanges as well as Medicare Advantage plans. Using these
data, I find that physician patient sharing appears strongly motivated by common hospital affiliation. Additionally,
although control variables also appear to provide utility to physician patient sharing ties, the relative importance of each
of these channels is found to vary considerably.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the basic model. Section 3 presents the empirical
specification along with the tetrad maximum score estimator and the main variable definitions. Section 4 covers the
data and descriptives. Section 5 reports the main results, Section 6 provides a discussion of the main findings, and Sec-
tion 7 concludes.
2 | BASIC MODEL
Let N={1,…,n} be the set of physicians within market m, and let i and j denote typical members of the N set. The col-
laboration (or mutual patient sharing status) of all the physicians in market m is given by the network (or adjacency
matrix) g={gi,j|i,j∈N}, where elements are gi,j=1 if i and j are collaborators, and gi,j=0 if they are not.3 Let g+gij denote
network g with a link added between i and j, and g−gij denote network g with a link removed between i and j. Define N
(i;g)={k∈N|gi,k=1} as the set of agents with whom i has a mutual (two‐way) collaboration (i.e., a link). The utility of a
physician from a given network configuration g is written as the summed benefit from all of his/her collaboration ties.
That is,
UiðgÞ ¼ ∑
N
k ∈ Nði; gÞ
uik; (1)
where uij is the benefit i receives from having j as a collaborator (i.e., this is a link specific payoff). The marginal benefit
from i and j forming a link is given by4
muij ¼ Uiðgþ gijÞ þ Ujðgþ gijÞ
 
− Uiðg − gijÞ þ Ujðg − gijÞ
 
¼ ∑
N
k ∈ Nði; gþgijÞ
uik þ ∑
N
k ∈ Nð j; gþgijÞ
ujk
 !
− ∑
N
k ∈ Nði; g − gijÞ
uik þ ∑
N
k ∈ Nð j; g − gijÞ
ujk
 !
¼ uij þ uji
 
¼ 2uij;
(2)
where 2uij captures the direct symmetric benefits that accrue to i and j from forming a direct link.
The equilibrium notion used is that of pairwise stability (due to Jackson & Wolinsky, 1996). This states that the phy-
sician patient sharing network g is pairwise stable if
(i). for every gi,j=1, Ui(g)+Uj(g)≥Ui(g−gi,j)+Uj(g−gi,j)⇔muij≥ 0; and
(ii). for every gi,j=0, Ui(g)+Uj(g)≥Ui(g+gi,j)+Uj(g+gi,j)⇔muij≤ 0.
Condition (i) states that if we observe a link between i and j (gi,j=1) then it must be the case that the overall payoff
from having the link exceeds the payoff should i and j remove the link. Similarly, condition (ii) holds that if no link is
3As is standard, gi,i=0, ∀ i∈N.
4Regarding the notation, if gij=1, then Ui(g+gij)=Ui(g), and if gij=0, then Ui(g−gij)=Ui(g). This captures the notion that a link can either exist or not.
Also note that link specific payoffs are assumed to be symmetric in that uij=uji.
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observed between i and j (gi,j=0), then it must be the case that the joint payoff from not having a link is greater than that
which would be obtained from i and j adding a link.
Next, we consider the empirical specification of the marginal utility and specify the tetrad inequalities that follow
from our definition of pairwise stability and that will be used for the purpose of our parameter estimation.
3 | EMPIRICAL APPROACH
3.1 | Pair specific payoffs and tetrad inequality
In order to bring our model to data, we need to specify the pair specific payoff term, muij, and give it a functional form.
5
To this end, let this marginal utility be given by
muij ¼ γHospitalAf f iliationij þ X ′ij þ Ai þ Aj þ ξ ij; (3)
where Hospital Affiliationij captures i and j
′s degree of shared hospital affiliation; Xij denotes the other pair specific attri-
butes that are observed in the data; Ai and Aj are the unobserved physician‐level attributes (accounting for physician
level degree heterogeneity), and ξij is the pair‐specific error term that is assumed to be independently and identically
distributed across all physician pairs. Identification rests on the assumption that E[ξij|HospitalAffiliationij,Xij,Ai,Aj]=0.
As has previously been noted (see, e.g., Graham, 2017; Kim, 2018), the fact that the econometrician does not observe
Ai or Aj poses an important threat to identification in the context of our problem, as omitting these physician fixed
effects can result in biased estimates of our parameters θ=(γ,β).6,7Moreover, the sparsity of real‐world social networks
makes it problematic to estimate the unobserved fixed effects directly because most agents within these networks have
few links (low degree). Alternative approaches for dealing with this issue have been suggested for inequality estimators
within the matching (see, e.g., Fox, 2010) and network (Kim, 2018) literatures.8 This approach has us select a tetrad of
individuals—that is, four distinct individuals i,j,k and l, where gij=1, gkl=1, gil=0, gjk=0, gik=0, gjl=0. Here, pairwise sta-
bility implies that for the linked pairs (gij=1, gkl=1), we have
muij ≥ 0 ∧ mukl ≥ 0: (4)
Whereas for the non‐linked pairs, we have (for gil=0, gjk=0)
muil ≤ 0 ∧ mujk ≤ 0; (5)
and (for gik=0, gjl=0):
muik ≤ 0 ∧ mujl ≤ 0: (6)
Combining inequalities (4) and (5) yields the tetrad inequality:
muij þmukl ≥ muil þmujk; (7)
and similarly, combining (4) and (6) yields
muij þmukl ≥ muik þmujl: (8)
5Following prior work in this area, I employ a parsimonious specification where the marginal utility has a additively separable functional form (see,
e.g., McCalman & Rysman, 2019, in the case of a network formation application or, Fox & Bajari, 2013, in a matching setting).
6The issue stems from the fact that a given physician may have a lot of links due to some important unobserved characteristic—for example, being a
highly regarded physician due to having a reputation of providing high quality care. This latent quality factor is hence captured by the Ai term.
7Potential threats to identification include unobserved pair‐specific factors that are not additively separable, and therethrough not fully captured by the
individual fixed effects. Further, although the approach does account for physician unobservables (Ai,Aj), our specification assumes these enter linearly
and that they are not interacted with any of the pair‐specific characteristics, Xij. Additional details on study limitations are provided in Section 6, and
estimates from an alternative specification are included within the Supporting Information as a robustness check.
8Graham (2017) uses a similar approach to deal with unobserved degree heterogeneity within his tetrad Logit model.
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β
From inequalities (7) and (8), it is clear that the individual level heterogeneity terms (Ai,Aj,Ak,Al) will cancel out
because they appear on both sides of the inequalities. As such, the omission of unobserved physician‐level characteris-
tics that may cause degree heterogeneity within the data will not bias our parameter estimates.
3.2 | Variable definitions
The physician pair specific variables (Hospital Affiliationij,Xij) used within the empirical model control for a number of
physician, patient, and institutional characteristics that have been identified within the literature as potential drivers of
physicians' patient sharing. Here, I outline the variable definition for hospital affiliation and the controls for each of the
other link formation channels.
3.2.1 | Hospital affiliation
To account for patient sharing that is motivated by shared hospital affiliation, I control for whether physicians i and j
are members of a number of common hospitals. This is defined as cSameHospitalij ¼ Hi∩Hj
 , which returns a count for
the number of overlapping hospitals between i and j (i.e., the cardinality of the intersection between the set of physician
hospitals of i (Hi) and that of j (Hj)).
3.2.2 | Other common institutional affiliations
It may also be the case that physicians within a particular group or system tend to share patients with other physicians
within the boundaries of their shared organization. The measure for a shared physician practice is given by
cSamePracticeij ¼ PPi∩PPj
 , where PPi denotes the set of practices that i is affiliated with. Shared system affiliation
is captured using: dSameSystem ¼ 1 Si∩Sj
  > 0 , where Si denotes the set of hospital systems that i is affiliated with,
and dSameSystem takes a value of 1 if i and j have at least one shared system and 0 otherwise.
3.2.3 | Homophily
Patient sharing may occur along social or friendship ties that are the result of physician homophily—that is, where phy-
sicians form patient sharing ties on the basis of their shared characteristics. To this end, I control for physician's gender
and experience. I control for shared gender using dSameGenderij ¼ 1 Gi ¼ Gj
 
, where Gi denotes the gender of i and 1(.)
denotes an indicator function that takes the value of 1 when i and j have the same gender. For experience, the squared
difference of physician i′s and j′s years of experience captures potential assortative link formation on the basis of shared
years of experience: sExperienceij ¼ Ei−Ej
 2
, where Ei denotes the years of experience of physician i.
3.2.4 | Knowledge complementarity
Patient sharing ties may be established based on physicians' differences in their expertise, that is, there may be impor-
tant knowledge complementarities of certain physicians that drive patient sharing. To capture physicians' overlap in
terms of their knowledge, I consider each physicians knowledge vector Ki={si1,si2,…,sin}, where si1=1 if physician i lists
specialty si1 as one of their specialties (and si1=0 otherwise), and define i and j
′s knowledge overlap as the uncentered
correlation of Ki and Kj: jSpecialtyij ¼ KiK ′j=ð
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
KiK ′i
q
þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
KjK ′j
q
Þ. This measure takes values between 0 and 1, with 1 indi-
cating perfectly overlapping specialties.
3.2.5 | Patient considerations
Patient sharing may be based on physicians' patient considerations. For example, distance may impose possible
access to care issues for patients that the physician may wish to avoid if possible. To capture such considerations,
I control for the distance between physician i and j′s practices using their zip codes to compute the travel distance.
That is, distance is defined as Distanceij = d(Zipcodei,Zipcodej), where d(.) measures the distance between the center
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of Zipcodei and Zipcodej. Other patient considerations may relate to the patient's insurance in the cases where the
Medicare patients have Medicare Advantage coverage. The influence of shared insurance network affiliation is cap-
tured by: cSameMANetworkij ¼ NMAi ∩NMAj
 , where NMAi ¼ fPlani1; Plani2; …; Planipg is a set of all Medicare
Advantage plans that physician i is part of.
3.2.6 | Spillovers
Last, other professional interaction may lead physicians to share medicare patients. For example, it may be the case that
physicians' sharing of other types of patient groups leads to the establishing of patient sharing ties that spillover and
cause the physicians to also share Medicare patients. I investigate this possibility by controlling for physicians' shared
participation in insurance networks for non‐Medicare (i.e., “other”) types of patients. This overlap is measured using
cSameOtherNetworkij ¼ NOi ∩NOj
 , where NOi ¼ fPlanOi1; PlanOi2; …; PlanOipg is a set of all non‐Medicare Advantage
plans that physician i is part of.
3.3 | Tetrad maximum score estimation
The estimator employed within this study is a tetrad‐level maximum score estimator (a la Kim, 2018).9 This estimator
has important computational advantages that make it feasible to apply it to large scale networks like the physician
patient sharing network within this study. Moreover, Kim (2018) shows that the utility parameters are point identified,
and importantly that bias concerns related to individual‐level unobserved heterogeneity are ameliorated by the fact that
these individual fixed effects are canceled within the tetrad‐level maximum score estimator. The estimator in the case of
one large market is given by
QðβÞ ¼ 2 N
4
 	 	−1
∑
i; j; k; l ∈ T
1
2
½1 sijklðθÞ ≥ sikjlðθÞ
 þ 1 sijklðθÞ ≥ siljkðθÞ : (9)
In Equation (9), we have sijklðθÞ ¼ 1 X ′ijθþ X ′klθ
 
ð1 − aikÞð1 − ailÞð1 − ajkÞð1 − ajlÞ
 
where aik,ail,ajk,ajl∈A(g)=G+I,
with A(g) denoting the adjusted adjacency matrix obtained by taking the actual adjacency matrix for network g (given
by G) and adding an identity matrix to it so that the diagonal elements of A(g) are equal to one rather than zero. The
adjustment term ð1 − aikÞð1 − ailÞð1 − ajkÞð1 − ajlÞ
 
in sijkl(θ) ensures that the tetrads selected satisfy the requirements
for pairwise stability and also help ensure the existence of a pairwise stable equilibrium as well as identification (see
Watts & Jackson, 2001, 2002; Kim, 2018). In terms of identification, as is common for this type of estimators, we are able
to identify relative magnitudes but not an absolute level. As such, I impose a normalization where one of the θ param-
eters is set to ±1 causing all the other parameters to be interpreted relative to this value (see, e.g., Fox, 2010).
Estimation of the parameter vector (θ) is implemented using a differential evolution search algorithm, and confi-
dence regions are computed using random subsampling (see, e.g., Fox & Santiago, 2014).
4 | DATA AND DESCRIPTIVES
Focusing on the Chicago hospital referral region, I consider all physicians (with a MD or DO credentialing) that see
Medicare patients and who are therefore present in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Physician
Compare registry in 2016. The Physician Compare dataset contains detailed physician level information regarding phy-
sician characteristics such as gender, years of experience, schooling, primary and secondary specialties, along with insti-
tutional information regarding physician group and hospital affiliations. Group practice and hospital affiliations are
determined using Medicare claims data. A physician is defined as affiliated with a given hospital if they provided ser-
vices there to at least three different patients, on at least three different occasions, occurring within the last year. In line
9Early work on the maximum score estimator was done by Manski (1975); however, more recent work by Fox (2018, 2010) has applied the maximum
score estimator toward the estimation of pairwise‐stable two‐sided matching problems.
10For a complete list of physicians specialties, see the Supporting Information.
11The insurance network data are for the 2016 plan period, whereas the Medicare Advantage network data is for 2017. Although the use of 2017 Medi-
care Advantage Network data might introduce some noise into the data, I use plan CMS provided crosswalks in order to map the 2017 plans back to
2016 plans. In so doing, I see that majority of the plans did not change between 2016 and 2017, with only about 3% of the plans being discontinued.
These were excluded from the analysis.
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with previous work (see, e.g., Barnett et al., 2012b), I remove physicians to whom referrals are less likely (i.e., physicians
whose primary specialty are anesthesia, pathology, and radiology). The remaining physicians consist of 1,306 primary
care physicians, medical, and surgical specialists.10 Additional physician level data on physicians' insurance network
affiliations for both Medicare Advantage and other plans were sourced from the company Vericred. The non‐Medicare
Advantage plans span most individual (under 65), small‐, mid‐, and large‐group market plans sold both on and off the
federal and state exchanges.11 Hospital system affiliation was linked from the American Hospital Association.
Last, the physician level data are linked with CMS's data on physicians' sharing of Medicare patients. The patient
sharing network ties are constructed from Medicare Claims data and were provided by Carelink Labs. Here, the
unipartite physician network is a simple projection of a bipartite physician‐to‐patient network (as described in, e.g.,
Barnett et al., 2012b; Landon et al., 2013). Previous work has found that one would want a minimum of nine shared
patients for a network link to be considered a shared patient tie and to further reduce the risk of including spurious
links that may be driven by patient choice (Barnett et al., 2011). This notion of a minimum criterion for a link to denote
a patient sharing tie is preserved within the data as per CMS privacy policies provider pairs who shared less than 11
distinct patients together (within the given time period) are not included in the data.
Table 1 presents summary statistics at the physician‐level. Here, we see that physicians are on average affiliated with
1.9 hospitals, 1 practice, and 0.8 systems. Close to 30% of the physicians are female and the physicians have on average
27.9 years of experience and 1.5 specialties. Last, looking at the physicians insurance network memberships, we see that
they are on average part of 5.2 Medicare Advantage networks and 20.4 exchange (non Medicare‐Advantage) networks.
Next, Table 2 provides summary statistics for the pair‐specific variables for three different cases: (i) the realized
patient sharing ties within the data; (ii) the expected pair specific value from purely random link formation between
any two physicians i and j within the data; and (iii) the expected pair values within a network where ties are formed
randomly conditional on preserving the degree distribution of the realized patient sharing network.12 Comparing the
TABLE 1 Summary statistics at physician‐level
Variable Mean SD N
cHospital 1.855 1.264 1,306
cPractice 1.048 0.560 1,306
cSystem 0.834 0.594 1,306
dFemale 0.298 0.457 1,306
cExperience_yrs 27.93 10.046 1,306
cSpecialties 1.467 0.636 1,306
cMA_Networks 5.172 5.852 1,306
cOther_Networks 20.382 8.199 1,306
Note. Prefixes “d” and “c” denote a dummy variable and a count variable measure, respectively.
TABLE 2 Summary statistics for physician‐pair variables
(i) Realized links (ii) Random links (iii) Random links | degree dist.
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
cSameHospital 0.896 0.604 12,091 0.108 0.335 853,471 0.148 0.4 12,091
cSamePractice 0.521 0.630 12,091 0.060 0.266 853,471 0.078 0.302 12,091
dSameSystem 0.595 0.491 12,091 0.092 0.289 853,471 0.123 0.328 12,091
dSameGender 0.654 0.476 12,091 0.582 0.493 853,471 0.63 0.483 12,091
sExperience 190.290 253.587 12,091 202.171 264.447 853,471 203.608 264.138 12,091
jSpecialty 0.262 0.355 12,091 0.145 0.294 853,471 0.211 0.317 12,091
Distance_KM 5.286 8.403 12,086 11.302 8.411 852,165 11.946 8.861 12,086
cSameMA_Networks 1.843 3.046 12,091 1.324 2.658 853,471 1.269 2.437 12,091
cSameOther_Networks 15.127 6.689 12,091 12.804 6.788 853,471 13.721 6.123 12,091
Note. Prefixes “d,” “c,” “j,” and “s” denote a dummy variable, a count variable, an uncentered correlation, and a squared difference measure, respectively. Part
(i) provides results from the patient sharing data; Part (ii) provides the expected results in the case of random link formation; and Part (iii) lists the results one
would expect if link formation was random conditional on preserving the degree distribution within the observed data.
12The conditionally random network is constructed using the monte carlo sampling method put forth by Viger and Latapy (2005).
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values across the realized values and those obtained across random link formation provides details on the extent to
which observed links between physicians are assortative. A consistent trend is that the realized average link value is
higher than either one of the values expected from random link formation. This observation lends descriptive support
toward physician collaboration ties being non‐random and instead the outcome of physicians assortative (and
disassortative) sorting into patient sharing relationships.
The finding of assortative link formation can further be illustrated by mapping out the physician patient sharing
network and visually examining it for evidence of non‐random network structures. This is done in Figure 1a where it
showcases the physician network for the Chicago hospital referral region (HRR). In Figure 1a, we observe a number
of clusters within the data, which again suggests non‐random link formations between physicians and considerable
degree‐heterogeneity among physicians. Figure 1b illustrates the network structure one would expect if physicians were
to form links at random conditional on the observed degree distribution within the data. Comparing Figure 1a,b, we are
further able to appreciate the amount of structure that exists within the observed physician network. Next, Figure 1c
shows the actual network (as in Figure 1a) but highlights physicians with hospital affiliations at Northwestern Memo-
rial Hospital (red), University of Chicago Medical Center (purple), Rush (yellow) and University of Illinois hospital
(orange). Figure 1d similarly highlights four hospitals that make up Presence hospital system in Chicago. What is clear
in Figure 1c,d is that there appears to be clustering among physicians on the basis of hospital and hospital system affil-
iation. Figure 1e illustrates the set of physicians that are part of one of United Health's Medicare Advantage HMO plans
within the data and highlight that this particular network has a significant existence within physicians affiliated with
Presence hospital system and also among physicians associated with Northwestern Memorial but has hardly any phy-
sicians affiliated with the University of Chicago in its network. Last, for the sake of comparison, Figure 1f highlights
physicians associated with a PPO silver plan offered by the Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Company on
the exchange. This plan has a much wider coverage of physicians than the previously considered network.
(a) (b)
(c)
(d) (e) (f)
FIGURE 1 (a) Physician network (Chicago HRR); (b) random network with the same degree distribution as the physician network; (c) 4
hospitals highlighted; (d) hospital system highlighted; (e) Medicare Advantage insurance network highlighted; and (f) market‐based
insurance plan highlighted [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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The next section explores the relative effect of hospital affiliation on physicians' link specific utility by estimating the
model put forth in Section 2.
5 | RESULTS
Table 3 presents the tetrad maximum score point estimates along with their 95% confidence regions (column 1), a rel-
ative contribution of each average effect compared to the average effect of dSameGender (column 2), and the relative
contribution of each effect when compared with the absolute link specific utility (column 3).13 The estimates were
obtained from a random subsample from the set of tetrads (consisting of 57,834 tetrads and 115,668 inequalities). The
95% confidence regions were constructed by subsampling using 200 draws, each with a 30% subsample of physicians
(see, e.g., Fox & Santiago, 2014; Kim, 2018). Because the tetrad maximum score estimator is able to identify the relative,
but not the absolute, magnitude of each marginal effect, I normalize the same gender dummy (dSameGender) to +1 and
use it as the reference parameter.14
13The average absolute link utility is computed as: ‾uij ¼ ∑i β^i
 *‾xi , where ‾xi denotes the average value of variable xi, :j j is the absolute value, and
the sum is taken across all variables. Using this as the reference utility ensures that the percentage contributions of all effects sum up to 100%.
14The parameter for dSameGender was set to +1 as this yielded a higher score (with more inequalities being satisfied) than a −1 value did.
15This relative effect is computed by dividing the same hospital estimate by the same gender estimate, that is,
β^cSameHospital
β^dSameGender
¼ 34:063
1
¼ 34:063.
TABLE 3 Maximum score estimates: A random sample 115,668 of all inequalities was used
(2) (3)
(1) Relative % Absolute
Link channel Variable Estimate Contribution Contribution
Hospital affiliations cSameHospital 34.063 46.7 36.5
(11.612, 43.192)
Other affiliations cSamePractice 31.613 25.2 19.7
(4.883 , 39.379)
dSameSystem 6.728 5.1 4.8
(5.558, 8.7481)
Homophily dSameGender 1 1 0.8
(−,−)
sExperience −0.005 −1.5 1.1
(−0.008 , 0.004)
Specialty jSpecialty 10.279 4.1 3.2
(7.583, 13.751)
Patient considerations cSameMA_Networks 0.499 1.4 1.1
(0.417, 0.694)
Distance_KM −1.653 −13.4 10.5
(−2.180, −1.466)
Spillovers cSameOther_Networks 1.231 28.5 22.3
(1.058, 1.655)
Numb. Links 12,086 — —
Numb. Inequalities 115,668 — —
% Ineq. Satisfied 98.478 — —
Note. A total of 95% confidence regions were constructed using 200 random draws of a 30% subsample of physicians. The same gender dummy
(dSameGender) is normalized to +1 and it is used as the reference parameter estimate column. The average link utility effect relative to that of the
average same gender effect is reported in the column (Relative Contribution). For example, the relative effect of cSameHospital is given by:
β^cSameHospital*cSameHospital
β^dSameGender*dSameGender
¼ 34:063*0:896
1*0:654
¼ 46:7. The percentage contribution (% Absolute Contribution) of each effect is given by its relative absolute
contribution towards the link specific utility obtained by multiplying the estimated parameter by the corresponding variable evaluated at its average
population value, and dividing this by the overall link utility. For example, the percentage contribution of cSameHospital is given by:
β^cSameHospital
 *cSameHospital
∑i β^i
 *xi ¼
34:063*0:896
83:6196
¼ 0:365, where ‾xi denotes the average value of variable xi.
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The core hypothesis is that patient sharing will be driven by physicians having common hospital affiliations. I find sup-
port for this hypothesis as physicians belonging to one or more common hospitals (cSameHospital) positively contribute
towards physicians' link specific utility. Looking at column 1 (Estimate) in Table 3, we see that the marginal effect of
shared hospital affiliation (cSameHospital) is 34 times that of shared gender (dSameGender).15 To gain further insight
about the relative contribution of physicians' shared hospital affiliation toward their link specific utility, we can look at
columns 2 and 3 in Table 3. Column 2 reports the average contribution of shared hospital affiliation relative to the average
contribution of shared gender. In this case, the figure is 46.7
β^cSameHospital*cSameHospital
β^dSameGender*dSameGender
¼ 34:063*0:896
1*0:654
¼ 46:7
 !
which tells us that for the average physician patient sharing link, shared hospital affiliation contributes 46.7 times more
towards the link utility than does physicians' shared gender. Column 3 reports the percentage contribution of physicians'
shared hospital affiliation relative to the absolute link specific utility. Here, we note that shared hospital affiliation on
average contributes 36.5%
β^cSameHospital
 *cSameHospital
∑i β^i
 *xi ¼
34:063*0:896
83:6196
¼ 0:365
0
B@
1
CA to wards the absolute link specific
utility.
Additional potential channels for patient sharing are further included as controls. Considerable variability in rela-
tive impact of these channels is noted. First, common physician practice groups (cSamePractice) also positively con-
tribute to physician utility from link formation, as does belonging to a common hospital system (dSameSystem).
Overall, motives due to these other shared institutional affiliations appear to contribute 24.5% of the absolute link spe-
cific utility.
Second, physician homophily is examined. Table 3 provides evidence of positive assortative link formation among
physicians with a common gender (dSameGender) and years of experience (sExperience). Overall, homophily arguments
are found to contribute a total of 1.9% of the absolute link specific utility.
Third, it was stated that physicians may form patient sharing ties on the basis of the complementarity of their knowl-
edge. Table 3 shows that we in fact find the opposite result—physicians tend to form links with other physicians who
share some degree of knowledge overlap with them (jSpecialty), and the benefit they derive from such a link appears to
be increasing in the degree to which their skill sets overlap. In total, I find that link formation driven by knowledge
overlap contributes 3.2% of the absolute link specific utility.
Fourth, physicians' patient considerations can influence who they share patients with. Specifically, the distance
(Distance_KM) between two physicians offices negatively affects their link specific utility. An additional supporting find-
ing is that physicians' link utility increases with the number of Medicare Advantage insurance plans
(cSameMA_Networks) that they have in common. The complete contribution is here 11.6% of the absolute link specific
utility.
Finally, sharing of a particular patient group was influenced by physicians' collaboration on other patient groups.
This spillover effect was controlled for using the count for all other (non‐Medicare Advantage) insurance plans that
the physicians had in common (cSameOther_Networks). The link specific utility is increasing in the number of insur-
ance networks that the physicians share, and overall, I find that the contribution due to this spillover effect contributes
22.3% towards the absolute link specific utility.
6 | DISCUSSION
In the present study, I apply a revealed preference framework to estimate physicians' link specific utility, using a rich
dataset that allows me to focus on the effect of physicians' common hospital affiliation on patient sharing and to control
for a number of other potentially confounding link formation channels, while also accounting for physician degree het-
erogeneity from latent physician characteristics. To summarize, I find considerable variation in the relative contribution
of each channel towards the absolute link specific utility, where shared hospital affiliation contributes the most,
followed by other institutional affiliations, collaboration spillovers, patient considerations, specialty/knowledge comple-
mentarity, and homophily. In what follows, I seek to discuss some of the implications of these results for administrators
and policy makers and discuss limitations of the current study with potential for future work.
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6.1 | Institutional affiliation
The central finding of this paper is that shared hospital affiliation yields most of the link specific utility for physicians.
This suggests that expanding physician and physician practice alignment with hospitals/hospital systems may be a
potential strategy for reducing the fragmentation of patient care beyond current institutional boundaries (conditional
on the number of links being the same). It is interesting to note that in the last couple of years, we have in fact observed
such a trend with an increased number of physician practices aligning themselves with hospitals/hospital systems (see,
e.g., Kane, 2018). From a patient perspective, it may suggest that selecting a physician within one affiliation network
increases the likelihood of referral to a peer within the same practice, hospital, or health care system.
For the administrator, the finding that hospital affiliation plays a key role in physician patient sharing carries impli-
cations for minimizing patient “leakage,” which occurs when a patient leaves one institutional system to receive care
from another. Managing and reducing patient leakage beyond the boundaries of physicians' core care team are of
importance to both the reduction of patient care fragmentation but also to institutional bottom lines. The results found
here suggest that physician group alignment with a hospital or institutional system may increase within system patient
sharing, resulting in a move towards within system collaboration that occurs organically. These findings are consistent
with those reported by Carlin, Feldman, and Dowd (2016) and Walden (2016), where the authors demonstrate that
physicians under common ownership begin to refer to one another following a hospital merger.
From a policy point of view, the results reported here can be beneficial in the move towards defining Accountable
Care Organizations. Prior work has suggested that using physician patient sharing data to select ACOs can possibly
lead to better adoption by tapping into already existing network infrastructure among physicians (Landon et al.,
2013). The finding that shared hospital affiliation contributes the most towards physician's link specific utility suggests
that forming ACOs around the institutional boundaries of hospitals can potentially help reduce care fragmentation for
patients.
6.2 | Collaboration spillovers
In the present study, physicians' belonging to common insurance networks appeared to also be a large contributor to
utility from patient collaboration and sharing. This finding is of particular interest as belonging to shared insurance net-
works for (non‐Medicare) market‐based plans was found to influence and shape physicians' patient sharing behavior of
Medicare patients. Such spillovers may highlight the importance of relationship strength for physicians' patient sharing
decisions, but it may also reflect some burden of initial referral—a physician can reduce the time impact (and overall
cost) of sharing patients by sharing with the same colleagues repeatedly (this idea is supported by the literature sur-
rounding team productivity and team familiarity, see Agha et al., 2018).16 Administrators seeking to improve care coor-
dination or reduce leakage, as well as policy makers attempting to define ACOs, may consider the importance of
examining the insurance network overlap of physicians within institutions or practice settings in order to capitalize
on this potential driver of patient sharing.
6.3 | Specialty/knowledge complementarity
The observed sorting on the basis of knowledge overlap is unexpected, especially considering that we are controlling for
factors related to common institutional affiliation. It might be that physicians tend to form links with other physicians
that are like them in terms of their skillsets due to homophily. This is supported by survey data reported by Meltzer et al.
(2010), in which physicians tend to form social ties most frequently with those from the same specialty. In that case, the
increased utility from patient sharing is reflective of this social bond between physicians. Alternatively, it might be a
manifestation of defensive medicine where physicians collaborate with others that share their skillsets in order to
reduce risks related to medical errors or misdiagnosis (see, e.g., Song, Sequist, & Barnett, 2014).
In either of these scenarios, it is possible that patient sharing despite knowledge overlap is indicative of inefficiency
within the system and points to a potential source of care fragmentation. One solution may come from further
16This finding also bears some resemblance to the “norms hypothesis” (put forth by Newhouse & Marquis, 1978) in that physicians may share patients
not on the basis of insurance of any given patient, but rather on the most likely insurance network requirements they encounter most frequently
(across all of their patients—that is, Medicare and non‐medicare patients).
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adoption of the medical home model, in which the primary care physician serves as coordinator for all the specialists
that an individual patient sees. However, it is also important to consider the role of specialist collaboration in diagno-
sis and treatment of complex or rare medical disorders—as Agha et al. (2018) point out, there is a trade‐off between
the optimal strategy of the PCP seeking to reduce the effort of care coordination from referrals with quality derived
from a patient having more options of specialists to see in order to find an ideal patient‐specialist match. Further
research is needed to determine optimal network structure in cases where a large number of specialists are needed
for effective care.
6.4 | Study limitation and avenues for future work
The question that has motivated this study is: What drives the formation of physician patient sharing networks in
Medicare? Importantly, this question asks for the channels that cause physician patient sharing. Although the present
study attempts to formulate a structural micro‐founded model to address this question, and although it does control
for a number of potential channels that may influence the formation of physician patient sharing ties, giving a causal
interpretation to the estimated effects requires accepting a number of strong assumptions that are important to
highlight.
First, identification within the present study rests on the assumption that links form independently conditional on
physician‐pair observables (HospitalAffiliationij,Xij) and, importantly, on the latent physician attributes (Ai,Aj). The abil-
ity to control for physician fixed effects is a strength of the method; however, it is possible that some of the findings may
be driven by some unmeasured physician pair‐specific features that the study fails to account for.17,18 Reverse causality
may furthermore be of concern in some instances. Given this limitation, the present study has put its main focus on
exploring the channel related to shared hospital affiliation as these limitations may likely pose less of a threat to iden-
tification for institutional features of physicians then to other mechanisms such as, for example, insurance network
effects.19
Second, if we assume that the physician pair‐specific unobservables do not raise identification concerns, then a
causal interpretation will here rest on assuming that the physician link specific utility function is accurately specified.
The present study has followed the prior empirical literature on network formation and matching in adopting a sim-
ple and parsimonious model specification and empirical functional form. As noted by McCalman and Rysman (2019)
and Fox and Bajari (2013), parsimony is an important model selection criterion within the early stages of this litera-
ture. Although parsimony may be an important guiding principle for selecting a model, imposing these restrictions
may again call into question potential endogeneity concerns. A finding within the current study, however, that helps
ameliorate some of these concerns is the result that the estimated model is able to satisfy a great majority of all the
tetrad level inequalities implied by a pairwise stable equilibrium. This lends support in favor of the model's parsimo-
nious specification.
The listed threats to identification of particular causal effects present opportunities for future work in this area.
Although the present method accounts for latent physician specific unobservables, it does not estimate the physician
fixed effects. Estimating these latent terms would open the possibility for conducting counterfactual analysis where
researchers can begin to compare observed network structures, which may be pairwise stable, but not necessarily glob-
ally efficient, to alternative network configurations that can help improve efficiency. Additionally, extending the present
analysis to also include non‐physician clinicians with whom physicians may also commonly share patients may present
additional insights on patient sharing among health care professionals at large.
17For additional discussion on issues related to endogeneity within matching models see, for example, Graham (2011).
18It is worth noting that the approach here will be able to capture some physician‐pair specific unobservables so long as these can be assumed to be
additively separable, and thereby be picked up by the physician fixed effects.
19For example, in the case of insurance networks, while it appears probable that physician's sharing membership in common insurance networks may
lead them to establish patient sharing ties, it is also a possibility that a patient sharing relationship can cause them to—over time—align in order to
ensure they are part of the same insurance networks. This type of reverse causality argument, however, appears less probable in the case of shared
hospital affiliation, as it is likely that sharing hospital affiliation may bring about a shared patient relation, but the reverse–two physicians who share
patients decide to become affiliated with the same hospital—appears less likely.
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7 | CONCLUSION
The present study finds that common hospital affiliation is a strong driver of patient sharing behavior. This study builds
on a body of literature interested in understanding physicians' Medicare patient sharing behavior by implementing an
empirical network formation model that allows one to measure the relative impact of a number of potential drivers of
network formation while accounting for unobserved physician characteristics. Being able to control for unobservable
influence due to, for example, physician reputation and quality is critical to establishing a credible case for causality.
Understanding the drivers of physician patient sharing is of great policy relevance as many current health care market
innovations focus on improving the way health care professionals collaborate in their care delivery.
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